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DETERRING IRAN, 1968–71
The Royal Navy, Iran, and the Disputed Persian Gulf Islands
Richard Mobley
Between 1968 and 1971, Whitehall assigned the Royal Navy an unusual mis-sion—to defend a series of disputed Persian Gulf islands while the United
Kingdom was selling arms to and conducting naval exercises with Iran, the very
country that threatened to invade them. The ownership of Abu Musa, Greater
Tunb, and Lesser Tunb—three islands astride the western approaches to the
Strait of Hormuz—was as controversial in the late 1960s as it is today.1 The cur-
rent controversy has its roots in complicated historical claims and the way Great
Britain defended, and ultimately negotiated a handoff of, the three islands. To-
day it is possible to gain a far more refined understanding of Britain’s naval and
diplomatic strategy for protecting and then disposing of the contested islands.
Hundreds of formerly secret British military and diplomatic documents have
been declassified and released on the subject since 1999. They are a rich resource
for understanding the controversies associated with British naval planning to
defend the islands and London’s undertakings to its former charges when it fi-
nally withdrew from the Gulf in 1971.
BACKDROP
Tehran and London had long disputed ownership of
Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. For over a
century, Britain had engaged in “indirect rule” of the
Arab states abutting the Gulf. Under treaties signed
with tribal leaders, the United Kingdom would handle
defense and foreign policy but leave domestic affairs
to the emirs themselves. By 1970, the defense policy
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required a commitment of forces to defend such Gulf client states as Bahrain,
Qatar, and the Trucial States. The United Kingdom prepared contingency plans
(such as HELIX, or Reinforced Theatre Plan [Gulf] No. 1) to protect such states
against their neighbors—Iraq, Iran, and each other). The plans required a rela-
tively small presence of British air, naval, and ground forces, which were based
primarily in Bahrain and Sharjah (now one of the emirates of the United Arab
Emirates). The long-standing plans relied on timely alertment, rapid implemen-
tation, and speedy reinforcements from outside the Gulf.2
All such contingency plans became harder to implement in January 1968,
when Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that Britain would withdraw
from its defense commitments east of Suez. Its defense obligations and military
presence in the Gulf were to cease by December 1971. The key players on the mil-
itary side, notably the Chiefs of Staff Committee and Commander, British
Forces Gulf, accordingly began planning for a “run-down” of British forces. This
task was particularly challenging because Britain remained obligated to defend
the Gulf client states until the withdrawal was complete, no matter how much the
British overseas force structure had shrunk at any given time—and, as the table
shows, the withdrawal from the Gulf was to occur rapidly.
However, the Royal Navy also relied on a
naval “covering force” from the Far East. As of
September 1971, an attack carrier would be
able to respond to Gulf contingencies within
two weeks. In November 1971, an attack car-
rier was scheduled to be able to respond
within five days; a helicopter assault ship
(LPH) could enter the Gulf within eight days.3
While in the process of withdrawing, the
United Kingdom would also continue to
craft foreign policy on behalf of its clients.
Unfortunately, anticipating the imminent
departure, Iran, ruled by Shah Reza Pahlavi, began immediately more forcefully
asserting its long-standing claim to Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb.
Tehran claimed legal ownership of the islands and declared a desire to ensure
stability of the Gulf (and protect sea lines of communication through the Strait
of Hormuz) by occupying them. In response, the United Kingdom, on behalf of
the emirates of Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah, asserted that all three islands were
Arab territory. London explicitly backed Sharjah’s claim to Abu Musa and Ras Al
Khaimah’s claim to the Tunbs. With its security obligations scheduled to lapse
by the end of 1971, however, Great Britain attempted to resolve the islands dis-
pute, while fostering the creation of the new United Arab Emirates (UAE).4
1 0 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Platform May October
Minesweeper 4 -
Frigate 1 1 (48-hour notice)
LSL 1 1
LCT 1 1
Hunter (fighter) 23 9
Shackleton (patrol) 5 2
PLANNED 1971 DRAWDOWN
Source: CBFG, “Military Action to Counter Arab Guerilla Occupation of Abu
Musa and the Tunb Islands” (Annex B), 30 March 1971 (DEFE 28/576).
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The British were well aware of the conflicting interests involved in the south-
ern Persian Gulf. The Foreign Office repeatedly described the high stakes inher-
ent in the British intermediating position. On one hand were large British arms
sales to Iran, Iranian support for maintaining regional stability via the Central
Treaty Organization, and Tehran’s acquiescence to Bahraini independence and,
in late 1971, the founding of the United Arab Emirates. On the other side of the
ledger was London’s desire to retain influence in the Arab world and foster stabil-
ity in the Persian Gulf even after Britain’s military withdrawal from the region.5
Accordingly, Britain crafted a military strategy designed to straddle the fence.
Commander, British Forces Gulf (CBFG) would monitor Iranian approaches to
the islands and intensify air and naval patrols should the shah seem too interested
in them. Beyond such posturing, the extent to which Britain should go to defend
the islands was controversial. Faced with debates within Whitehall and between
London and its representatives in the field, the United Kingdom crafted a compro-
mise, top secret plan designed to bluff any Iranian invading force away from Abu
Musa (Great Britain considered the Tunbs indefensible)—that is, to deter Iran
without alienating it. A second plan was formulated to retake the islands (and
thereby forestall an Iranian invasion) should they be seized by Arab guerillas.
Britain’s different approach to the three islands was based in part on geogra-
phy. Abu Musa is closer to Arab shores (lying south of a notional median line
that the United Kingdom was arguing could be used to divide the Gulf) and
more salient to Arab clients; the Tunbs were closer to Iran. Abu Musa was larger
than the other two islands, and oil and gas reserves were suspected to lie about
six miles to the southeast. From an Arab perspective, the Tunbs had little to offer.
The Tunbs are seventeen miles southwest of Iran’s Qeshm Island and forty-six
miles northwest of the nearest point on the UAE coastline. Greater Tunb is
roughly 2.5 miles in diameter and had at the time a population of approximately
150 Arabs. Lesser Tunb is eight miles to the southwest; it was barren, waterless, and
uninhabited. Neither had airstrips, jetties, or fuel supplies.6 The shah, however,
had long focused his attention on the Tunbs, and in the late 1960s he began to
press his claim to Abu Musa with equal vigor. Abu Musa is approximately three
square miles, with an estimated eight hundred inhabitants in 1971. Abu Musa suf-
fered from the same lack of militarily useful facilities as did the Tunbs.7
PENSUM
When Prime Minister Wilson announced the end of British treaty commitments
east of the Suez Canal (a position that Edward Heath’s Conservatives would sus-
tain when they assumed power in 1970), the shah became more vocal about Ira-
nian claims to the islands. He argued that only Iran could now ensure safety and
stability in the Gulf, including freedom of shipping through the Strait of
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Hormuz, and that to do so Iranian forces would have to garrison the islands.8
London worried that Iran might seize the islands even before Britain left the
Gulf. In January 1968, the United Kingdom did not even have a contingency
plan to defend the islands and lacked basic knowledge about beaches it might
have to assault. This would change when the Imperial Iranian Navy began oper-
ating close to the Tunbs.9
The first “mini-crisis” started on 12 January
1968, when a photo-reconnaissance Royal Air
Force (RAF) Canberra sighted and photo-
graphed the Iranian frigate Bayandor anchored
approximately one mile east of the Tunbs.
(Commander, British Forces Gulf routinely re-
connoitered the disputed islands and monitored
southern Gulf waters to prevent illegal immigra-
tion and arms smuggling into the Trucial
States.)10 An RAF Shackleton, a propeller-driven
maritime patrol aircraft, quickly corroborated
the sighting. Fearing that Iran would occupy
Tunb, CBFG prepared to deploy elements of the
Trucial Oman Scouts to defend it—if Iranian
troops were not already there. The scouts were
put on four-hour alert. However, when Lon-
don’s emissary to the Trucial States arrived on
the island from Dubai the next day, Bayandor
was gone. Instead of garrisoning any of the islands, CBFG settled for continued
aerial surveillance of the surrounding waters.11
The Royal Air Force’s interest in Iranian shipping near the Tunbs provoked an
Iranian warning. Bayandor had manned and trained its guns on the Shackleton
that overflew it near the Tunbs on 12 January.12 Great Britain and Iran both pro-
tested the incident. The United Kingdom declared that it was “deeply disturbed”
that the Iranian navy had violated the territorial waters of the Tunbs (i.e., those
of Ras Al Khaimah).13 Iran for its part protested repeated “harassing flights” over
an Iranian naval vessel operating in “Iran’s coastal waters.”14 An Iranian diplo-
matic note warned that such surveillance was “unfriendly” and that if the flights
continued the Iranian ship would “take such action as considered necessary in
accordance with international law.”15
A month went by before the next development in this crisis, when British
maritime patrol aircraft flew repeated surveillance passes near the Iranian naval
auxiliary Tahmadou in the southern gulf. Admiral Rasa’i, commander of the Ira-
nian navy, complained to Commander, British Forces Gulf that a large RAF
















Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 4, Art. 9
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss4/9
aircraft (presumably a Shackleton) had repeatedly overflown Tahmadou as it op-
erated near the Tunbs. He asked for an explanation for the incidents, which
might be “misinterpreted” in Tehran. When debriefed, the Shackleton crew ex-
plained that it had initially approached the vessel about midday on 22 February,
no closer than 440 yards, at an altitude of four hundred feet. Recognizing it to be
a naval auxiliary, the Shackleton stood off. The two subsequent passes had ap-
proached no closer than a mile away. Rasa’i accepted the explanation but asked
that British patrol aircraft stand off at least three miles from Iranian warships
unless they had prior permission to approach closer.16
On the British side, the seeming Iranian threat to the Tunbs sparked an inter-
nal debate about how to defend the islands. A dialogue between Sir Stewart
Crawford, the political resident (the senior diplomatic official in the theater, re-
sponsible for orchestrating British foreign policy in the Gulf), and Frank
Brenchley and M. Weir, in the Foreign Office Eastern Department, framed the
argument. Crawford, with the agreement of CBFG, concluded that the best way
to defend the islands against Iran was by stationing troops on them. He wanted
at least to erect a radio transmitter on Greater Tunb to speed the flow of infor-
mation from this remote island. The Foreign Office Eastern Department coun-
tered that a confrontation might escalate and “seriously endanger our
considerable interests in Iran, commercial (including oil) and military (overfly-
ing).” (The best way for the United Kingdom to support its forces in the Far East
entailed flying through Iranian airspace.)17 The Foreign Office held that garri-
soning the islands would be too provocative. Indeed, the Eastern Department
considered relations with Iran so important that it questioned whether Great
Britain should resort to any kind of military force to protect the islands. If Iran
invaded the islands, Weir’s version of “defense” was merely to lodge a diplomatic
protest in the United Nations and perhaps suspend arms deliveries to Iran: “I
should find it difficult to approve a recommendation to put troops on the is-
lands even if an Iranian move appeared imminent.”18
The political resident, in response, cited Britain’s repeated pronouncements
that it would defend the Trucial States. What would London say if one of the
trucial sheikhs asked for British reassurance as an Iranian threat developed? “Ei-
ther the Minister of State and the Prime Minister meant what they said in stating
that so long as we had the capability we should continue to honour our obliga-
tions, or they did not.”19
A second mini-crisis, however, seems to have forced the United Kingdom to
begin planning to defend the islands militarily. On 29 March 1968, the Foreign
Office received a report (from uncited sources) that Iran might try to seize the
Tunbs over the next two days. Abandoning the Eastern Department’s earlier pas-
sivity, the Foreign Office requested immediate Royal Navy patrols off the
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disputed islands. CBFG consequently ordered two minesweepers to make a day-
light transit past the northern side of Tunb Island on 30 March. Either the as-
sault ship HMS Intrepid or the frigate HMS Tartar, or both, would also steam by
the islands on the thirty-first, while Shackletons reconnoitered the area.
(Ironically, Intrepid had just been conducting assault landings with the Irani-
ans.) None of these units were to do anything other than report back to
Whitehall if Iran invaded the islands. After the transits, the Defence Ministry
warned the theater commander that the “situation . . . is still very delicate and all
provocative action is to be avoided.” Iran never attempted to occupy the islands
during this episode.20
Using the just-ended crisis as a scene-setter, Sir Stewart made his case for a
formal plan to defend the island. He argued that the shah remained a threat to
the islands despite diplomatic warnings and air and naval patrols. The United
Kingdom could defend the islands by preemptively landing troops before the
Iranians could arrive. He reasoned that Iran might attempt to seize the Tunbs
first, given their relative proximity to Iran and perceived strategic importance to
the shah. If Iran took the Tunbs, Crawford believed, CBFG should land on Abu
Musa before the Iranians could arrive there as well.21
Accordingly, in April the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence directed the
preparation of a contingency plan for British troops to occupy Abu Musa should
Iran threaten or occupy the Tunbs. The Foreign Office explained its change of
heart to the defense minister. It admitted that the United Kingdom had previ-
ously ruled out landing on the islands to deter an Iranian assault. Now, however,
it argued, a British failure to take more than diplomatic action would “rally Arab
opinion against us, again with severe damage to our interests, including difficul-
ties over the military withdrawal from the Gulf.”22 However, Whitehall contin-
ued to foreclose the obvious solution of simply stationing a permanent garrison
on the islands, because such a move would provoke Iran. Moreover, a British
garrison would have to be withdrawn when Great Britain left the Gulf, whereas a
garrison manned by Trucial Oman Scouts could simply be overrun once the
United Kingdom departed.
From this debate emerged PENSUM, the United Kingdom’s primary plan to
deter Iran from invading any of the disputed islands; it remained effective from
spring 1969 until the United Kingdom withdrew from the Gulf in December
1971. It called for a military bluff—a show of force in which British units would
be prohibited from actually attacking Iranian invaders. To deter Iran from seiz-
ing the Tunbs, CBFG would merely increase sea and air patrols around them. A
Royal Navy frigate or minesweeper could be on station as well with twenty-four
hours’ notification. The British combatant would advise Iranian ships ap-
proaching to within three miles of the island (and apparently intending to land
1 1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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troops) that they were within Ras al Khaimah’s territorial waters. The Royal
Navy would formally protest the landing, but its warship on the scene would not
attempt to prevent it. Neither would British troops land on either island, under
any circumstances.23
As for Abu Musa, CBFG would also increase patrol activity. If the Iranians
seized the Tunbs, two Wessex helicopters could transport a platoon of up to
thirty-two people from Sharjah to Abu Musa—provided the Iranian army had
not already arrived there. (If CBFG belatedly discovered an Iranian military
presence on Abu Musa, the British assault platoon would turn around and heli-
copter back to base.) The remainder of an infantry company (presumably the
platoon’s parent company) could reinforce the platoon. Assuming the British
military got to the island first, the British commander would warn the Iranian
commander that Abu Musa was Arab territory under the protection of the
United Kingdom and that his force was not to land. If the Iranians landed any-
way, the British platoon was to “endeavor to restrict their further movement
from the point of disembarkation without using force.” In no case were British
military units to attack Iranian forces, whether or not they overran Abu Musa,
except in self-defense or to defend the lives of island inhabitants.24
BUDLET/ACCOLL
Great Britain never had to implement PENSUM. However, the Royal Navy soon
found itself in the middle of a battle among three emirates, two international oil
companies, and Iran. This third mini-crisis began in the spring of 1970, when
the rulers of the emirates of Umm al Qaywayn and Ajman permitted the Occi-
dental Petroleum Corporation to start exploratory drilling 6.5 miles southeast
of Abu Musa. Unfortunately, unbeknownst to any of the participants, Sharjah
had extended its claimed territorial limit around Abu Musa from three to twelve
miles in September 1969, and it had awarded a drilling concession of its own for
the same area, to the Buttes Oil and Gas Corporation.25
Word of the conflicting drilling leases and territorial claims spread, and Iran
entered the act. The Iranian foreign minister warned that his nation’s warships
would prevent Occidental from drilling in the disputed zone. Nevertheless, the
firm’s drilling operation moved toward Abu Musa late in May 1970. Occidental
initially advised that drilling would not start before 1 June. Meanwhile, RAF
Hunters (fighters) deployed to nearby Sharjah, and Shackletons flying daily sur-
veillance missions searched for Occidental’s derrick barges, survey vessels, and
tugs, as well as for Iranian warships that might be en route to the contested drill-
ing zone. The Royal Navy committed four minesweepers to the operation.26
The United Kingdom was determined to prevent a maritime blowup. To stop
Occidental from drilling, the Foreign Office used diplomatic pressure but also
M O B L E Y 1 1 3
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requested CBFG to stand by to tow away the drilling platforms and take other ac-
tions to prevent drilling operations. Royal Navy units were to “obstruct” the
drilling platforms if they attempted to work in the disputed areas. Royal Marines
embarked aboard the minesweeper HMS Gavinton to board the barges should
Occidental insist on drilling despite British warnings. The political agent in
Dubai warned Occidental on 31 May that drilling would violate an edict of the
ruler of Umm al Qaywayn. Next day, the Royal Navy warned Occidental that it
was not to begin drilling in the disputed area for at least three months. After two
days of intense diplomacy, Occidental agreed. On 3 June, its drilling barge de-
parted for Khafji, Saudi Arabia.27
Commander, British Forces Gulf considered the outcome favorable. The Brit-
ish ships and aircraft had “exerted a stabilising influence” by demonstrating
London’s intention and ability to prevent drilling operations (and discourage
“precipitate” Iranian naval action). Occidental, however, was less impressed and
initiated legal action against the Royal Navy and other elements of the British
government. The firm claimed that the United Kingdom had illegally hindered
its operation and in the process damaged a drilling rig.28
Eight months later, the shah intensified pressure on London and its client
states. In February 1971 he gave a public interview echoing what he had said pri-
vately—Iran would simply seize the three islands if a diplomatic solution was
not forthcoming. Iranian naval activity buttressed his warnings. Iranian war-
ships thrice violated the territorial limits of the Tunbs that month. In a fourth
instance, an Iranian vessel
put a landing party onto
Greater Tunb Island.29
Over the next month,
London concluded that the
risk of Iranian invasion of
the islands before the final
British departure had grown.
The Chief of Defence Staff
reminded his staff as well as
senior service leaders that the
Joint Intelligence Committee
had recently concluded that
“there [were] substantial reasons” why Iran might invade the islands before the
British withdrawal.30 In particular, he and the Foreign Office worried that Iran’s
increased pressure over the Tunbs might produce an unconventional response
from radical Arab states (such as Iraq) or a state-sponsored guerilla group. The
diplomats specifically feared that to preempt an Iranian invasion, an Arab guerilla
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force of perhaps fifty men landing from dhows might seize one or all of the is-
lands. Iran might respond by invading the islands, potentially while they re-
mained under British protection. The Foreign Office confirmed to the military
that Iran should understand “that our protection of the disputed islands is not
merely nominal, but will be real and effective up to the date of our departure.”31
Whitehall thus wanted to be able to block seizure of the islands by unconven-
tional warfare forces—either Arab or Iranian.
Accordingly, the Defence Ministry in March 1971 directed that the theater
commander prepare a new plan.32 Commander, British Forces Gulf quickly real-
ized that information on landing beaches on the Tunbs was lacking. On the
night of 13 April 1971, the minesweeper Puncheston conducted a clandestine
beach survey.33 With the intelligence the ship collected, CBFG completed a con-
tingency plan known as BUDLET/ACCOLL in May. BUDLET addressed the preven-
tion of a landing of up to fifty guerillas on all three of the islands. If the guerillas
succeeded anyway, British forces were to “evict” them under subplan ACCOLL. In
this event the Royal Navy would blockade the islands and warn the intruders to
surrender or to leave the islands. If the warnings were unheeded, helicopters and
ships would deploy a squadron of the Trucial Oman Scouts to the islands.
Hunter aircraft would provide close air support. Unlike in PENSUM, British
forces were not restricted by ACCOLL from engaging the enemy.34
Interestingly, the Foreign Office felt that the United Kingdom might choose
not to implement the plan even if guerillas invaded the islands. Rather, the For-
eign Office opined hopefully, an Arab guerilla invasion might provide an oppor-
tunity for Iran and the emirates to cooperate in evicting the insurgents.35 It
concluded in a memorandum for the record that “political considerations”
might “militate as strongly against preemption as they do against garrisoning of
the islands.”36
The real purpose of the plan, of course, was to convince the shah that he did
not need to invade the islands while the British were defending them. In May
1971, the ink barely dry on BUDLET/ACCOLL, Sir William Luce of the Foreign
Office flew to Tehran to pursue further negotiations and to reassure the shah
that the United Kingdom now had contingency plans to defend the islands.37
By 15 November, after energetic negotiation by Sir William, Iran and
Sharjah had reached “virtual agreement” on Abu Musa. Iran and Sharjah
would occupy separate parts of the island; there would be a twelve-mile terri-
torial limit around Abu Musa, and the inhabitants could fish in both countries’
zones. Sharjah would designate a company to exploit the oil resources off Abu
Musa; Iran and Sharjah would split the revenues. In a separate agreement, Iran
would provide aid to Sharjah for nine years. A memorandum of understanding
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from Sharjah to the United Kingdom (and agreed to by Iran on 25 November
1971) summarized all this.
Luce foresaw that with the agreement signed with Abu Musa and with Ras al
Kaimah’s refusal to cede the Tunbs to Iran under any circumstances, Iran would
simply station forces on all three islands a day or so before the agreement was an-
nounced—most likely between 30 November and 3 December 1971.38 In fact,
they landed on the thirtieth. Sharjah sent a representative to greet the Iranian
troops. However, the Iranians encountered token resistance when they landed
on the Tunbs, with the result that four Iranians and Arabs were killed.39
“REASONABLE HOPES FOR STABILITY”?
The residual military presence in the Gulf and the flurry of contingency plan-
ning between 1968 and 1971 doubtless afforded some reassurance in Whitehall
as Britain pursued a diplomatic resolution of the islands dispute. However, to
maintain the status quo Great Britain ruled out what it knew to be the most di-
rectly effective means of protecting them—establishing garrisons. PENSUM
could well have backfired; from the tone of his statements, it is hard to believe
that the shah would have backed down once having decided to invade Abu Musa.
The image of a British platoon begging the shah’s troops not to land on Abu
Musa is not an attractive one. Would the posturing envisioned in PENSUM really
have been better than doing nothing?
BUDLET/ACCOLL at least reflected a coherent strategy and a reasonable
matching of means (the residual British force in the Gulf) and ends (removal of
a small guerilla band). The Chiefs of Staff Committee believed the operation
could be completed within a month. Rapid and effective action might have fore-
stalled an Iranian invasion.
At the end of the day, the cabinet viewed the episode as a success story. In De-
cember 1971 Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the foreign minister, told the cabinet that
“there were [now] reasonable hopes for stability in the Gulf area, an outcome for
which our emissary, Sir William Luce, deserved warm congratulations.”40
The conspicuous Royal Navy and Air Force presence had supplemented Brit-
ish diplomacy in deterring Iran. Iran ultimately invaded the islands, but on the
last day of British protectorate; it had not humiliated the United Kingdom by
doing so months earlier, when the islands had been manifestly under British
protection. (Presumably Tehran was concerned to allow responsibility for the
“loss” of the islands to fall on London rather than on the emirates themselves—
which accordingly were not honor bound to seek reprisals or reverse the situation.)
Today, despite the Royal Navy’s efforts in 1971, the status of the islands re-
mains controversial. In 2003 testimony before the International Court of Justice,
the United States accused Iran of using Abu Musa as a base for helicopter and
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Boghammar speedboat attacks against commercial shipping during the “tanker
war” of the 1980s.41 In 1992, the United Arab Emirates accused Iran of violating
understandings reached when Sharjah allowed Iranian forces onto Abu Musa
(Ras Al Khaimah, now part of the UAE, never accepted Iranian occupation of
the Tunbs). Specifically, the UAE protested Iran’s attempts to limit access to Abu
Musa, and Iran evidently became concerned that the UAE might even invade the
islands (with outside assistance). Indeed, when the United States surged forces
into the Gulf in response to renewed Iraqi threats to Kuwait in the fall of 1994,
Iran reportedly increased its defenses on Abu Musa.42 Tehran’s hold on these is-
lands is likely to remain a sensitive point as the United States occasionally
“surges” naval forces into the Gulf, as well as intensifies its rhetoric, in its cam-
paign against the “axis of evil.”
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